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THE ARRESTED SUCCESS OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN ZAMBIA 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how legal and regulatory structures impact microfinance ownership 
and performance. It draws from the institutional story of Zambia which has experienced 
regulatory and legislative flux since drafting its first microfinance act in 2006. Based on 
interviews with key stakeholders in the Zambian microfinance industry, the paper highlights 
the negative effects of this act and the subsequent imposed interest rate cap. on the 
performance and outreach of MFIs how this relates to ownership structures. It finds that 
foreign rather than local ownership and not having historical roots in a not-for-profit model is 
advantageous for MFI survival in these turbulent institutional conditions. Therefore, it 
provides an important contribution to understanding the effects of regulatory failure in 
microfinance with theoretical as well as important practical implications.  
 
Keywords: regulation; microfinance; ownership, mission drift; institutionsmicrofinance, 
mission drift; institutions, Zambia, Zambia,.  
 
Introduction 
There is a growing body of research that recognises that the activity of Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) is shaped by their broader institutional context (Chliova, Brinckmann and 
Rosenbusch, 2015; Kimmitt, Scarlata and Dimov, 2016; Silva and Chavez, 2015) and/or can 
be critical actors in shaping new institutional arrangements (Khavul, Chavez and Bruton, 
2013; Mair and Marti, 2009). One critical aspect of the institutional environment outlined by 
researchers is the legal and regulatory context which has been shown to have significant 
implications for the performance and outreach of MFIs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 
2011; Cull, Navajas, Nishida, and Zeiler, 2015). However, we still know very little about the 
effects of this institutionally complex process, the role of regulatory change, how it comes 
about and the impact it has on MFIs (either positive or negative). Therefore, in this paper, we 
ask, how do legal and regulatory requirements shape the behaviour and performance of 
different ownership types of MFIs?  
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The institutional focus within extant microfinance research has developed partly 
because of the obvious institutional function that MFIs perform. Given the presence of 
information asymmetries and moral hazard amidst informal business activity, Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFIs) have emerged as social enterprises whose primary objective is to facilitate 
social change by stimulating entrepreneurial action through small loans (Zahra, Gedajlovic, 
Neubaum, and Shulman, 2009). In doing so, MFIs are able to meet their economic needs by 
covering operating expenses, loan losses and the expansion of their capital base and fund 
expected growth (Morduch, 1999; Fernando, 2006). The result of this is the emergence of 
legal and regulatory arrangements needed to promote transparency, efficiency, profitability, 
and overall sustainability of the industry.  
In addition, the need for MFIs to blend social and economic objectives means that 
MFIs can have complex hybrid organisational forms and ownership types. Many of the 
forerunners of microfinance operated not-for profit NGO models whilst a number of profit-
oriented shareholder owned MFIs now exist that exhibit some practices closer to commercial 
financial institutions (Khavul et al. 2013). Indeed, much of the policy discussion around the 
ownership structure of MFIs has focused on a perceived need to move over to a shareholder 
model that is presumed to promote external investment, profitability, sustainability and 
outreach (Mersland and Strøm, 2008). However, this is a contested space with contradictory 
findings amongst academics about the effects of different ownership approaches.  
Therefore, it is clear that regulatory arrangements and ownership represent two 
critical issues that indicate the complex nature of understanding MFI behaviour. In this paper, 
we understand the behaviour of MFIs as a consequence of their ownership dynamics that are 
intertwined with an institutionally complex regulatory process. To explore this, we employed 
a qualitative research design that involved semi-structured interviews with the major 
microfinance stakeholders in Zambia, 2015. This represents a particularly interesting context 
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for understanding the effects of legal and regulatory frameworks for microfinance because of 
the industry’s state of flux amidst the drafting of new legislation in the last decade, interest 
rate caps and struggles of some of the largest financial institutions. As such, we look to 
explain our research question by examining how MFIs responded to many of these key events 
and how it has affected their practices in terms of financial sustainability and outreach.    
Our study finds and highlights the lack of understanding amongst regulators about 
how to provide an appropriate regulatory framework for microfinance that differentiates 
between enterprise and consumption based lending. This ill-conceived framework 
subsequently produced an interest rate issue amongst consumption lenders, leading to an 
interest rate cap that harmed poverty and enterprise-focused MFIs. As such, the sector 
experienced a number of serious challenges and unintended consequences that had a 
disastrous effect on its financial viability. However, we identify that in these turbulent 
institutional conditions, foreign ownership is important to organizational survival and a 
historical basis as a not-for profit is particularly challenging for adaptation in these 
circumstances.  
As such, our findings contribute towards an ongoing discussion within the literature 
concerning how institutional conditions shape the activity of microfinance institutions (Silva 
and Chavez, 2015; Chliova et al., 2015) and on their orientation towards economic and/or 
social development logics (Khavul et al., 2013; Shahriar, Schwarz and Newman, 2016). In 
addition, we move away from previous studies which typically portray the successful 
institutional shaping activities of MFIs (e.g. Mair and Marti, 2009) and contribute towards an 
ongoing understanding of failure in microfinance (Siwale and Ritchie, 2013). In the 
following, we outline the theoretical background of the study, before the presenting the 
empirical context and methodology. We subsequently present our results, discussing their 
theoretical and practical implications.  
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Theoretical Background 
 
MFIs are typically regarded as social enterprises operating in the financial sector that provide 
financial services including credit, savings, insurance and retirement plans to the 
entrepreneurial poor (Khavul, 2010). Prior research on MFIs has argued that they are a 
specific type of organisation in that they focus on the explicit pursuit of both social and 
economic objectives (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mair and Marti, 2009). On the one hand, 
MFIs aim at solving social problems by helping the entrepreneurial poor to gain better access 
to capital; on the other hand, MFIs need to pursue strategies that facilitate and support the 
ongoing activity of capital provision to such people.  
 In this context, Mair and Marti (2009) argue that MFIs also act as institutional 
entrepreneurs, i.e., actors who look to transform a particular set of institutional arrangements 
and leverage the resources to do so (Dimaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000). 
Therefore, MFIs act to fill the institutional ‘void’ (or ‘imperfection’) left open by 
underdeveloped financial systems (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Roth and Kostova, 2003). The 
logic here is that MFIs allow entrepreneurs to work their way out of poverty by providing the 
necessary financial capital, thus stimulating entrpereneurial solutions to broader societal 
problems (McMullen, 2011). By acting in such capacity, MFIs are more likely to engage with 
entrepreneurs against the grain of established rules and norms as they are not “locked” into 
existing structures in the way that the commercial banking sector may be (Mair and Marti, 
2009). However, it remains unclear if MFIs shape or are shaped by their institutional context 
as it seems unlikely that all MFIs are the powerful instigators of institutional change that this 
part of the literature would suggest.  
 Khavul et al. (2013) highlight a more complex dynamic picture of the microfinance 
field that has shifted between development (i.e. poverty reduction), market and regulatory 
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logics. The initial focus of microfinance was on development within a non-profit model but 
an influx of investment and competition from for-profit organisations - and commercial banks 
- has moved many MFIs to combine their social missions with self-sufficient income 
generating activities (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Kent and Dacin, 2013; Shahriar et al., 
2016). Market logic shifted the focus onto financial sustainability and outreach through 
income generating activities; this is one foremost reasons for the criticism of some MFIs who 
have instead started to favour lower risk and marginally wealthier clients that yield a better 
financial return (Coleman, 2006; Copestake et al., 2005; Cull, 2007). This can lead to a 
deviation from the assumed social mission i.e. development logic (Mersland and Strøm, 
2010) where increased competition in the sector and a need to retain clients (Aubert, de 
Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2009) has placed greater emphasis on the finances of MFIs thus 
contributing to ‘mission drift’ (Copestake, 2007). In this respect, research has consistently 
indicated that the regulatory environment is important to microfinance, particularly in periods 
of crisis (Silva and Chávez, 2015). 
Thus, the legal and regulatory environment is a particularly important part of the 
institutional context of MFI activity. As Khavul et al. (2013) emphasise, MFIs can get stuck 
in conflicts over ‘regulatory logics’, as policy-makers seek to understand the complex overlap 
between socially oriented MFIs (which may be NGOs), their commercial bank counterparts 
and the health of a financial system that is comprised of a complex array of actors. In general, 
we know very little about the tensions between regulations and its effect on MFI activity. For 
regulators, one particular question has been whether MFIs can be incorporated into existing 
legislative and regulatory frameworks or whether new ones need to be drafted. In particular, 
there is a lack of understanding concerning some of the unintended consequences that can 
emerge under conditions of the ‘regulatory logic’.  
 
6 
 
The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Microfinance 
The rapid development of the microfinance sector has brought increasing calls for its 
regulation. In the interests of protecting the financial sustainability of the banking sector, 
policy makers view regulation as an important tool to bring MFIs in line with industry norms 
and to protect depositors. However, research has consistently highlighted the convergence 
between the commercial banking sector and the MFI industry (Brière, and Szafarz, 2015). As 
MFIs have to balance their social aims with the economic component of their organisations, 
complying with regulations can be quite a costly exercise. In the absence of credit rating 
mechanisms, MFIs rely on the judgment making of loan officers to implement MFI rules and 
policies (Canales, 2014). Therefore, it is a labour intensive approach to lending and 
subsequently a significant cost for the organisation to ensure compliance. With limited 
resources, MFIs may also require significant legal expertise and extra administrative needs to 
handle regulatory compliance which can be in short supply in developing economies. This 
burden simply increases costs for the MFI that need to be covered by how they generate 
income e.g. raising interest rates/searching for donor funds.  
Christensen and Rosenburg (2000) discuss two forms of regulation in the 
microfinance industry: prudential and non-prudential. The former involves the government or 
a central authority overseeing the overall health of the financial system aimed at protecting its 
viability. Therefore, any interventions by these parties is aimed at protecting system wide 
failure such as protecting depositors. The latter involves regulating institutions without the 
intervention of a central authority but through current rules i.e. fit and proper persons test for 
MFI ownership. Cull et al. (2011) found that when governments implement prudential 
regulations this has an adverse effect on the outreach of for-profit oriented MFIs whilst not-
for profits stay close to their missions but become less financially viable.   
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Other research on this topic, although limited in scope, has argued that well developed 
regulatory frameworks supervising the microfinance sector hinders outreach but improves 
financial performance – this effect being particularly prominent amongst for-profit MFIs 
(Cull, Navajas, Nishida, and Zeiler, 2015). In this context, “good” regulations can actually 
make it more costly for MFIs to comply but these are also intertwined with other features of 
the institutional context – rule of law, corruption, governance and so forth (Ahlin, Lin, and 
Maio, 2011). Hartarska and Nadolnyakb (2007) found that regulation doesn’t affect MFI 
performance in terms of either financial sustainability or outreach but it may benefit those 
MFIs who want to become deposit taking. MFIs can also see regulations as an opportunity 
because a change in legal structure can give them access to crucial commercial funds and/or 
allow them to become deposit taking rather than rely on donor funds (Hartarska, 2005). 
However, this focus on the commercial aspect of MFIs has been linked to the “mission drift” 
argument whereby financial sustainability is prioritised ahead of client outreach and change.  
Although this prior research has looked at the relationships between regulation and 
microfinance activity, we know very little about the consequence of such types of regulations 
and how MFIs, as social enterprises, respond in terms of their practices. As actors don’t 
always respond to all rules and regulations in their institutional environment, understanding 
its effects requires one to observe how actors respond to it in that space (Kitching et al., 
2013). Although prior research can draw the link between regulations and subsequent 
financial performance, we know very little about how MFIs adapt their behaviour amidst the 
implementation of prudential and non-prudential regulations; particularly in contexts where 
this threatens the financial sustainability of the sector as a whole.   
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Ownership of Microfinance Institutions 
The question of ownership has been a key theme in research on MFIs and other similar 
organisational forms such as social enterprises. On the one hand, the social objective 
embedded in MFIs calls for the creation of social value to solve social problems (i.e. poverty 
reduction through entrepreneurship). On the other hand, this social purpose co-exists with a 
more utilitaristic, economic need and purpose (Moss, Short, Payne, and Lumpkin, 2011). 
MFIs, as a type of social enterprise, are typically required to use business skills and market 
based approaches of revenue maximization and cost reduction to address social problems in a 
sustainable way (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Nicholls, 2010; Zahra et al., 2009). This is 
because they tend to operate in what Austin et al. (2006, p. 9) define as an “inhospitable 
context” to maximize their social impact, which alludes to the complexities of the 
institutional contexts that MFIs tend to operate in.  
These contexts are characterized by uncertain institutional environments, pushing 
social entrepreneurs to combine resources in innovative and effective ways to address social 
needs (Di Domenico, Haugh, and Tracey, 2010; Mair and Martí, 2006). This enterprise model 
exists alongside and often in some combination with NGO donor-based approaches that have 
historically been the dominant method for social change delivery in developing economies 
(Fowler, 2000). Thus, there exists a clear tension concerning how to reconcile the financial 
necessities of MFIs which naturally relates to how they fulfill their social missions (e.g. 
expanding outreach). As a consequence, the way in which MFIs approach this challenge is 
reflected in their differing ownership structures and approaches.  
Ownership across MFIs differs substantially. NGOs have been a popular mode of 
growing microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa and most of the big MFIs have emerged from 
that background. NGOs, unlike other ownership types, do not have owners and often rely on 
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donations and grants, something regulations have changed by allowing them to transform into 
commercial private firms. Armendariz and Morduch (2010) note that shareholder-owned 
microfinance institutions have been promoted as an efficient ownership form over non-
government and member-owned microfinance providers. Consequently, there has been huge 
support for a legal framework that can enable transformation into share-holder MFIs 
(Christen and Rosenberg, 2000; Christen, 2001; Rhyne and Otero, 2006; Frank and Lynch, 
2008). The assumption here is that private ownership in microfinance can work to attract 
commercial funds and deposits, curb excess costs and consequently lead to improved 
efficiency and expanded outreach to the unbanked.  
Mersland and Strøm (2008) have criticised and empirically supported the notion that 
shareholder-based MFIs perform better by highlighting that many NGOs can be financially 
sustainable MFIs and that a shift to a shareholder approach is misguided. Similarly, Mersland 
and Strøm (2009) delve deeper into issues of ownership by outlining that ownership has no 
impact on microfinance financial performance but that local rather than international boards 
of directors are likely to perform better. However, Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) argues that it 
is the measurement of financial performance that is critical for interpretation, with private 
shareholder firms performing better on financial rather than social indicators. Hartarska and 
Mersland (2012) investigate the optimal board size and its impact of MFI performance and 
similarly identify the importance of having decision-making power with local origins. 
Galema, Lensink and Mersland (2012) focus on the freedom of decision-making across CEOs 
where owners of NGOs tend to make riskier and poorer decisions.    
Overall, there is an inconsistency within the literature concerning how ownership 
impacts microfinance institutions.  In general, there is an embedded belief in the notion that 
shareholder owned MFIs unlike NGOs, would pursue commercial objectives, be more profit - 
oriented as well as financially sustainable, and benefit from corporate governance systems 
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(Abate, Carlo and Kindie, 2014). Therefore, according to Barry and Tacneng (2014), 
behaviour of MFIs can be influenced by their different ownership structures, legal status, 
financing structures, levels of regulation, their objectives and ultimately how they are 
governed.  
Overall, this leads us to think about the performance and behaviour of MFIs as 
operating within a web of institutionally complex arrangements (Munoz and Kibler, 2016). In 
this respect, elements and dimensions of the microfinance system are inherently related and 
dependent on one another to the extent that important actors operate under unpredictable 
conditions of emergent change (Byrne, 1998). This emergent change in a microfinance 
context necessitates an understanding of the interdependence between different types of MFI 
ownership and their wider institutional regulatory environment. We are particularly interested 
in highlighting how the emerging institutional regulatory environment in Zambia is changing 
the character and behaviours of MFIs and challenging their own survival; and consequently 
impacting on geographical spread and the kind of entrepreneurs they support. 
 
Empirical Context  
Zambia continues to face challenges relating to ongoing poverty, particularly in rural areas 
where more than half of the population lives (World Bank, 2014). According to recent reports 
by FinScope (2015), high levels of financial exclusion still exist throughout the country, with 
rural areas being particularly excluded from economic gains. Consequently, development of 
the microfinance sector is one of the priorities of the Central Bank and Government of 
Zambia (Brouwers et al., 2014). In addition, recent reports estimate that out of approximately 
924,000 micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in Zambia, only 10% have access to 
appropriate financial services. The Zambia Business Survey (2010) further reveals that 85% 
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of rural-based MSMEs are financially excluded with only 5% being banked (FinMark Trust, 
2012; Zambia Business Survey 2010). Access to suitable finance is therefore perceived as a 
significant contributor to the start-up and growth of MSMEs and sustainable microfinance 
important to the broader goal of addressing mass poverty. Accordingly, Zambia like many 
other developing countries, has sought to use microfinance to promote the goal of financial 
inclusion through regulation.  
The microfinance industry in Zambia can be described as young and still playing a 
relatively small role in financial inclusion, with approximately 300,000 clients as of 2015 
(AMIZ).  Brouwers et al. (2014) note that, Zambia has lagged behind countries in East Africa 
in enacting a regulatory framework for microfinance institutions. Responsible growth and 
deepening financial services to Zambians at the base of the pyramid was being hampered by a 
lack of a legal and supervisory framework for MFIs (Chiumya, 2006; Mudenda, 2002). For 
instance, although MFIs were committed to serving the poor, this was not done in an 
efficient, transparent and sustainable manner. Monitoring of MFIs by investors to ensure 
institutional soundness was insufficient and external reporting to investors and disclosure to 
clients was either erratic or non-existent. The expectation in the development of the 
regulations was that since MFIs served one of the most vulnerable segments of the 
population, these provisions would promote sustainable growth of MFIs, increase outreach 
and protect clients from the likelihood of exploitation and abuse (BOZ official, July 2015). 
Continued reliance on donor or government funds was deemed to be both detrimental and 
unrealistic. More specifically, there has been a shift toward sustainable, market-based 
microfinance through undertaking regulatory reform and improving the business 
environment.  
The global trend is where many MFIs have, and are changing from charities to profit 
–seeking business and adopting the status of regulated commercial financial institutions 
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(Brouwers, et al., 2014; Epstein and Yuthas, 2010). Zambia is no exception to tides of 
commercialisation. To support this change, the Banking and Financial services 
(Microfinance) Regulations, 2006 was enacted that provided a regulatory framework through 
which credit only MFIs could transform into  companies by shares and apply for a deposit-
taking license (BOZ, 2006; Chiumya, 2010). In some cases the original founders of NGOs 
became owners of the newly established institutions, while establishing MFIs from scratch 
(‘‘Greenfield approach’’) has been rare with enterprise lending but more common with 
consumption based MFIs. The Microfinance Regulations of 2006 also allowed for the 
formation or transformation of credit only MFIs into Tier I deposit taking MFIs. 
This institutional transformation process saw some of the large developmental MFIs 
embark on mobilisation of voluntary savings. Interesting to note however, that with the 2006 
Act, the sector now includes several salary-based lenders with significantly higher numbers 
of borrowers. Almost 90 percent of the microfinance sector’s portfolio is managed by 
consumption lending MFIs, which are based mainly in the big cities of Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt (Brouwers, et al., 2014; Bank of Zambia, 2014). As of July 2015, there were 36 
MFIs licensed by the Bank of Zambia, of which 11 are deposit taking made up of five 
developmental (see Figure 1) and six consumer-payroll lending MFIs (Interview with BOZ 
official, July 2015). Relative to other countries like Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, Zambia 
cannot boast of significant players in the developmental microfinance space and therefore 
impacting on its ability to support micro entrepreneurial activities. Despite the progress with 
the microfinance regulatory framework, Zambia presents a difficult terrain for microfinance 
development purposes and growth of the sector (especially the developmental subsector) has 
been inhibited by many factors (Siwale and Ritchie, 2013), including the capping of lending 
interest rates introduced in 2013.  
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Methodology 
This exploratory study is based on an intensive qualitative research conducted in July 2015 in 
Lusaka, Zambia complemented by one of the researcher’s own local knowledge. In addition, 
the first author has, prior to this work conducted extensive research on microfinance 
institutions in Zambia. This familiarity enabled the availability of networks to support the 
research. Despite, one of the authors being familiar with the local environment, access to all 
participating institutions, including the regulators was protracted. Further negotiations for 
access to additional MFIs continued after the researcher arrived in the country and elicited the 
help of personal local networks to grow the sample. The sample reflects a purposeful 
sampling approach (Sturgis, 2008) and is composed of 6 MFIs that are part of the 36 MFIs 
licensed by Bank of Zambia (BOZ). Out of these 36 MFIs, 11 are deposit-taking, and of 
which only 5 are classified as developmental or enterprise lending MFIs.  
The study focused on the typical enterprise MFIs and not consumption-based or ‘pay 
lenders’. Therefore 4 out 6 MFIs were deposit taking and enterprise based, while the other 2 
were non deposit taking but enterprise based. Other key participants were drawn from Bank 
of Zambia acting as regulators, the Association of Microfinance institutions in Zambia and 
one local microfinance expert. These institutions and persons were selected because they 
each presented what Stake (2000) referred to as an opportunity to learn. In all, 14 semi-
structured key informant in depth interviews were conducted. The use of a semi-structured 
interview style enabled room for the conversation to breathe (Bryman and Bell, 2011) and 
provided interviewees with the space to develop the depth of their reflection. 
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The questions were exploratory in nature and designed to reveal MFIs’ experience of 
regulations and their response to the changing regulatory framework, and in particular, their 
performance. Interviews ranged in length from 30 to 90 minutes. All the participants were 
proficient in the English language and therefore all the interviews were conducted in that 
language. In the interest of anonymity, all quotations and names of participants and 
institutions have been anonymised. To supplement interviews, secondary data were used. For 
instance, we triangulated interviews with the contents of the Banking and Financial Services 
(Microfinance) Regulations 2006, the revised Microfinance services bill 2014, consolidated 
income statements for enterprise lending MFIs and archived local media reports.  
Data Analysis 
The key themes from all the interviews were elicited with the use of NVIVO software which, 
as argued by Patton (1990) and Welsh (2002), is a useful tool for organising, managing and 
quantifying explicit and implicit themes and accompanying data. The data was transcribed 
and imported into the software, then triangulated and analysed until themes emerged. The 
common issues were identified and the differences in arguments were highlighted. Utilising 
the NVIVO software involved an iterative and reflexive process (O’Dwyer, 2004), as well as 
a careful engagement with the data.  Also word tree maps and text search queries in NVivo 
were used for interrelationships and meanings behind data narratives and all quotations in the 
text are verbatim. To enable a more in-depth and enhanced analysis of the relevant issues, 
secondary data was also obtained from the websites of microfinance institutions, the 
regulators, the apex associations, MIX market and other relevant sources.  
Limitations of the study were that the research focused only on 6 institutions, 4 of 
which are deposit taking and leading enterprise MFIs in Zambia. All 6 are licensed and 
regulated by the Central Bank. Although this may not be representative enough to draw any 
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general conclusions, the emerging narratives and experiences of participating MFIs and the 
other participants still gives us insights into the interplay between regulations and 
institutional entrepreneurs-the MFIs and the resulting tensions between performance and 
regulation.  
Results 
In this section, we highlight the themes from our data under three sub-headings. Firstly, we 
highlight the lack of understanding of the microfinance sector from key decision-makers 
concerning the appropriate legislation and regulatory framework for the sector in Zambia. 
This provides the context for understanding its effects and unintended consequences. 
Secondly, we demonstrate the implications of these regulations and their interrelationship 
with MFI ownership structures. Thirdly, we show how MFIs have struggled amidst this 
regulatory flux, specifically by focusing on the effects of the interest rate cap on microfinance 
practices and the investment into the sector.   
 
Lack of regulatory understanding and learning 
As regulators, the initial training of staff at Bank of Zambia was assisted by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID, UK), as they didn’t have an understanding of microfinance. They 
acknowledged that it was a totally new concept having traditionally only worked with 
commercial banks. The department of non-bank financial institutions supervision was then 
established in 2001, with the assumption that if a separate department was formed, it would 
be more effective as it would focus on the regulations and supervision of non-bank financial 
institutions-which included MFIs. However, the 2006 Act was ambiguous in the sense that 
traditional MFIs were not differentiated from consumer lenders and the market soon got 
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flooded with the easy to set up MFIs (salary-based) compared to development enterprise 
MFIs. Therefore, the 2006 regulations created an environment where the credit market ended 
up with more payday lenders or payroll-based lenders that have little to do with the poor, 
rural outreach and enterprise lending. As one BOZ official stated: 
“The problem is with the way we had defined microfinance. You will notice that the way this 
market is structured in Zambia, you have MFIs like FINCA which is typically providing 
microfinance in the definition of microfinance and then you have entities that are just providing 
salary-backed loans. Now even these entities have also been licensed under the microfinance 
regulations and that set up has basically been due to the way we defined microfinance in the 
current regulations of 2006”. 
He further added: 
“We did not anticipate the floodgate of salary backed MFIs – not until the regulations came into 
effect that we started seeing the really situation in the market- primarily due to how we had 
defined MF” (BOZ official, 2015).  
 
It is evident from the foregoing that one unintended consequence of the regulations was 
that it created a ‘safe’ regulatory framework under which the consumer-payroll lending MFIs 
operated and grew unabated. In response to this unintended consequence, the 2014 
microfinance service bill has redefined microfinance services and from the regulator’s 
perspective, this now fits with what is universally acknowledged as ‘best practice’ - where 
they are giving out loans to small businesses as opposed to providing salary backed loans to 
consumers. This is not surprising as by their own admission, they lacked knowledge and 
understanding of the sector and but still went ahead with an inappropriate regulatory 
framework. Arun and Murinde (2010) are of the view that, regulations play a significant role 
in the development of the microfinance sector, but to do that they have to be appropriate to 
bring about desired institutional behaviour and performance. Yet the challenge facing MFIs 
in Zambia was that, apart from the ambiguity surrounding the definition of microfinance, a 
lot of the provisions in the 2006 Act were taken straight from the Banking and Financial 
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Services Act. According to most practitioners, not only did the Central Bank lack expertise 
but the Act was not fitting with the essence of microfinance: 
 
“I am of the view that with the 2006 Act, BOZ was just doing a cut and paste of the commercial 
bank’s regulations as they didn’t understand the sector. Now they are more receptive, willing to 
learn and their knowledge of the sector has improved.” (CFO - MFI 2) 
 
Another added: 
 “In fact the central bank didn’t even have the expertise who could understand adequately the 
peculiarities of the sector and the director has acknowledged that. Even for them it was the 
learning journey. BOZ should have invested a lot in the MF sector; carry out research in order to 
understand the market for them to draw out similarities and differences” (MFI-1). 
Microfinance accordingly warrants a unique regulatory framework, which regulators in 
Zambia have now realised and followed that up with revisions as reflected in the 2014 
Microfinance service bill. With lessons learnt and industry almost crippled, the regulator 
admitted thus: 
“So we now have a stand-alone bill that will mainly be focusing on microfinance because the 
current banking Act has provisions that are not best suited for the microfinance sector. Now the 
emphasis of the 2014 microfinance bill is on lending to enterprises. Ideally we wanted to bring it 
(the definition) to the acceptable best practice of microfinance. Consumption based lenders will 
not be deemed as MFIs because they don’t typically provide microfinance as we know it. We 
want to align ourselves with what is best practice in terms of microfinance” (BOZ official, 2015) 
 
In reference to the regulators not having prior knowledge but learning about the sector as it 
transforms under fuzzy regulatory provisions, an official from the Association of 
Microfinance Institutions of Zambia noted: 
 
“They [BOZ] now seem to have an understanding of the business model of microfinance and the 
2014 Microfinance service bill has recognised that the microfinance business model is different. 
The regulators now see enterprise microfinance as playing an important role in improving 
financial access and are now keen to learn how they can support growth in the market.” (AMIZ, 
2015) 
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Managers interviewed were of the view that the prevailing institutional environment was not 
enabling success in the sector largely because the regulator’s experience of the sector was 
limited, coupled with an inappropriate definition of microfinance that failed to make a 
distinction between players in the industry. At issue here is the undifferentiated regulation 
between commercial banks and MFIs on one hand and on another, between typical enterprise 
lending MFIs and salary-based MFIs. There is however, a collective view that the new 2014 
Microfinance service bill will significantly shape the institutional context and bring desired 
growth to the sector that extends financial services to the unbanked.  
 
Implications of regulations and ownership 
This lack of appropriate regulatory provision between 2006 and 2014, therefore, provided the 
broad institutional context that shaped the behaviour of MFIs in this period and beyond, 
representing the empirical context for interpreting the rest of the data. Prior to regulations 
most MFIs operated as NGOs, enjoyed considerable subsidies and donor funds which 
allowed them to multiply and grow quickly (Siwale and Ritchie, 2013), but were not self-
sustaining. The 2006 Act prohibited ownership by trust and instead preferred ownership by 
shares. The implication of the new legal status is that most MFIs have been precluded from 
accessing donor funds. With that transformation comes an expectation from their 
shareholders that they will generate profits to finance further growth, and in some cases 
succeed in attracting foreign private investors. Yet, managers of MFIs acknowledged that the 
challenge of accessing affordable capital is unending and that finding private investors 
interested in the microfinance sector in Zambia has not been easy amidst the benefits that 
come with being regulated: 
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“However, as far as we are concerned these regulations have brought with them some challenges. 
The regulations require that MFIs operate as private companies whose main motive is profit 
maximisation. So because of the change in status, grant funding to the sector has dwindled as 
these MFIs now have shareholders who expect dividends. So you would not expect to attract 
grants (that are cheaper of course) because with grants you expect any profits to be ploughed back 
into the growth of the MFI and not the money to end up in shareholders’ pockets” (CEO, MFI 3). 
 
In practice, tensions arise as a result of changing institutional environments such as 
regulatory provisions on ownership structures. For example, having transformed from NGOs 
to commercial MFIs, one particular MFI found itself confronted with a tension between the 
social mission of reaching out to low income entrepreneurs and supporting micro-enterprises 
profitability due to costly sources of capital for growing their loan portfolio. Enterprise 
lending MFIs with 100 percent local shareholding were found to be struggling financially 
more than those that had majority foreign shareholding, simply because local shareholders 
had no money to pump in and were not willing to continue bearing the losses (BoZ official, 
July 2016). One CEO was of the view that a hybrid model of ownership would work better in 
an environment where most locals lack knowledge of the basic principles of what and how 
microfinance works. Referring to his own organisation, he noted that:  
 
 “MFI X would not have survived the interest cap, given that 80% of our clients are at the bottom 
end. We survived and able to recapitalise because our foreign shareholders are willing to bear the 
loss and allow the MFI adapt and respond to the challenge”. 
  
In institutional conditions where the previous NGO model is largely redundant, the findings 
here resonate with Martins and Winkler (2013) who found foreign-owned microfinance 
institutions to have more borrowers than domestic-owned institutions and were likely to 
expand financial inclusion among micro-entrepreneurs and poor households. In contrast to 
Mersland and Strøm’s (2009) study where they find local rather international boards to 
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perform better, we find MFIs with internationally dominated boards were more resilient and 
entrepreneurial in responding to the challenging institutional environment. 
 
MFI struggles amidst regulatory challenges 
Interest rate caps and MFIs’ response. Scholars are increasingly interested in understanding 
not only the importance of regulations but much more the implications thereof. Opinion is 
divided when it comes to the impact of  regulations, with some suggesting that depending on 
the context and case, these regulations can either spur or hamper the development of the 
sector (Arun, 2005; Arun and Murinde, 2010; Purkayastha, et al., 2014; Anku-Tsede, 2014). 
The case of Zambia is a complex and an interesting one because of the approach adopted and 
the scale of it. All financial institutions, including commercial banks were affected by interest 
rate caps introduced in 2012. Of importance to this paper is to explore how the regulatory 
logic and the interest rate capping changed the landscape and the behaviour of MFIs.  
The interest rate capping was an intervention measure because, according to the 
Central Bank, MFIs were charging unjustified interest rates to their clients. Interest rates as 
high as 200 percent were being charged, particularly so, by the pay day lender MFIs. 
Interviews with the regulators revealed that some of the larger enterprise lending and deposit 
taking MFIs were charging as much as 104% as annual effective interest rate. Considering 
that one of the reasons for regulating MFIs was to curb the culture of irresponsible lending, 
the Bank of Zambia felt that the market had failed and as such the consumer/clients needed 
protecting. The interest rate cap, therefore, was an example of a prudential intervention aimed 
at guaranteeing the long term survival of the microfinance system.  
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Prior to the capping of interest rates, the microfinance sector was catching the front 
pages for wrong reasons. One of the local media reporting on the plight of public workers and 
the poor urged the government to intervene: 
“We should not accept a system where loan sharks masquerading as responsible micro-lenders or 
banks steal what little our workers and the poor have in high interest charges. The government 
needs to move in and set some limits on interest charges to the poor and bring it to the same level 
as the interest that the rich pay. This situation demands that the government acts quickly to deal 
with this issue. (The Post July 2012) 
 
Although some MFIs may agree with the introduction of interest caps for legitimacy reasons, 
most felt that such an introduction had resulted in unintended consequences such as changing 
the approach for lending, loss of income, failed MFIs, limited lending and further neglect of 
the poor and micro enterprises. Several MFIs had responded by or were contemplating on 
scaling down the number of branches in rural areas as well as curtailing plans for establishing 
more.   
“So you can imagine that we are now being forced to choose between serving far flung areas and 
clients close by- the urban. Since we were already in the rural even before the interest cap, our 
decision to close these outlets is mainly due to the central bank to regulate the price. Effectively, 
these areas are now secondary when it comes to where to invest funds. So the big question is 
which SMEs do you target? Is it those in the rural or urban? (MFI 3) 
“We are currently contemplating closing some branches and only keeping the profitable ones as 
well targeting segments that are cheaper to service” (MFI 4) 
 
Other MFIs have stopped using group lending methodology that generally targets those 
accessing smaller loans in preference for individual lending. 
“Instead of targeting the micro market and very low income entrepreneurs and people, some MFIs 
went for big loans. They started giving big SME lending and as I speak right now, I  think that 
MFI X is only one that is still hanging on to this methodology of group lending and targeting the 
really small scale entrepreneurs” (MFI 5) 
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Furthermore, with the Central Bank imposed interest rate cap, many MFIs started introducing 
loan related fees which were not determined or ‘controlled’ by regulators.  Interestingly, most 
of these fees are in small print, and some MFIs were taking advantage of the fact that 
consumers never usually read the small print, as in this case clients were mostly interested in 
the ‘reduced’ interest rates that the Central Bank has introduced. The quote below is 
revealing: 
“All MFIs have increased fees and yet these fees were not this high before the cap. You see one 
thing that the BOZ is not helping us with is to source cheaper capital. So the cost of capital is high 
and what do you do to survive? If rates are capped resulting in reducing income, you hike the fees 
so as to absorb the cost of capital. That is what is happening. You see when these clients come to 
us to borrow all they ask for are interest rates, they don’t ask about other fees? So us we just tell 
them the interest rates and they don’t know that in some cases the fees could even be higher than 
interest charged” (MFI NDT 6). 
 
The quote above is not reflective on the espoused image of MFIs as social enterprises that are 
expected to do good for their clients. As would be expected the regulatory change in form of 
caps had a negative impact not only of MFIs but much more so on poor people who naturally 
have difficulties acquiring loans for their businesses. Managers of surveyed MFIs urged the 
authorities to remove the caps as they were threatening their survival and further restricting 
access to credit and outreach to outlying areas. The consensus view of surveyed MFIs was 
that, even if BoZ was to reverse the decision and resort to market determined interest rates, 
the damage done from 2013 to date is too huge to recover from in the short term (see 
appendix 1). This view was supported by the IMF, who in their Country Report of June 2015 
called for the elimination of interest rate ceilings and noted that, the introduction of interest 
rate ceilings had led to the contraction of the microfinance sector, resulting in some MFIs 
stopping lending completely while others only granted new loans to existing clients (IMF 
Country Report No. 15/152, 2015). In response to external pressure and to the deteriorating 
financial position of several MFIs, interest rate caps were removed at end of November 2015 
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and in May 2016, the deputy governor for operations at the Central Bank acknowledged that 
caps on the effective maximum lending rates the BoZ introduced in 2013 was a significant 
factor in hindering the performance of the credit market: 
“On balance, we did realise that maintaining the cap wasn’t producing the actual outcome that we 
wanted primarily because what it did was to reduce the level of credit; some institutions stopped 
lending, which wasn’t the intention of placing the cap (The Post Zambia , 22/05/2016). 
 
In a post-interest rate cap follow-up interview, the BoZ official pointed to the unintended 
consequences as factors behind lifting the cap. He noted that their internal study report 
(which could not be shared) revealed that, the average loan size had gone up because MFIs 
were finding it easier to grow their portfolio by increasing loan sizes and not extending 
outreach. This meant that the lower end where microenterprises operate was being left out 
and therefore failing on the goal of financial inclusion. In addition, all MFIs resorted to 
lending at the maximum provided for by the cap, meaning that even for those who could lend 
lower found no incentive to do so. Overall, the regulators noted that, MFIs reduced lending 
because business at capped rates was not sustainable and effectively, there was no growth in 
the sector. Thus the strategy adopted by MFIs seeking clients who are easier to assess and 
access jeopardised the more inclusive entrepreneurial spirit MFIs are expected to cultivate at 
the base of the economic pyramid (Kent and Dacin, 2013).  
Accordingly, Barry and Tacneng (2014) note that improving institutional environment 
and quality could encourage more profit-oriented MFIs to cater to more borrowers, including 
the poor. The other implication could also be that weak or inappropriate regulations coupled 
with inadequate capacity to understand microfinance have the potential to create tensions 
with the double bottom line for MFIs and especially for those with a mission of reaching out 
to the marginalised poorer clients and smaller businesses. It can be argued however, that in 
the case of Zambia the government had an obligation to protect clients from what was 
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evidently loan –sharking but its intervention was unstructured. MFIs in Zambia might be 
failing to effectively and sustainably support entrepreneurs because of their higher than usual 
operating costs, which in turn result in higher interest rates clients have to pay. 
 
Interest rate caps and investment in the sector. Another notable consequence of the caps was 
how it limited the growth potential of the sector. MFIs revealed that they were unable to 
attract foreign investors who thought that the law was too restrictive and were not happy with 
the direct intervention approach to managing the microfinance activities:  
“This cap is not in the interest of anyone except the people behind it (politicians). First, it should 
be seen as a disincentive to would be investors and it is also restricting growth. Our risk is very 
high and we also borrow huge sums of money from outside sources which includes commercial 
banks. So for us to scale up, lending MFIs must take loans from other sources with excess money 
to invest” (CFO-MFI 2). 
 
Controlling of interest rates, though well intended by the regulator, ended up discouraging the 
much needed investors into the sector. It also made local borrowing expensive as MFI’s cash 
flow positions deteriorated leading to some MFIs defaulting on the repayment of loans 
obtained under the old regime –before the cap. Therefore, relying on costly resources for their 
loan book could only mean one thing; scaling up by curtailing their outreach to those clients 
that are costlier to serve. As Earne and Sherk (2013) argue, funding is crucial in improving 
financial access because it ensures that MFIs have the resources needed to expand through 
increasing the number of clients served and geographical, and product diversification. Those 
MFIs with access to cheap external funding would be expected to offer cheap loans to poor 
borrowers and to income-generating activities and micro enterprises, thereby promoting and 
supporting their development (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011). Interestingly, in the case of 
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Zambia, even those MFIs with access to cheaper external funding still charged at the cap and 
not lower.  
However, the reduced investment in the sector was not just an issue of investors 
lacking incentives but also an inability of MFIs to adapt to a changing funding context. In the 
case of Zambia, those MFIs with NGO ownership backgrounds struggled with the 
responsibility of a non-donor environment. From an entrepreneurial point of view MFIs in 
Zambia have a viability problem which then translates into focusing more on institutional 
survival than on the clients’ enterprises:  
“Take an example of an MFI where I sit on the board; this MFI borrowed money but are now 
failing to service that loan but MFIs we set up to lend to the poor and expecting them to pay back 
and yet MFIs are themselves defaulting!” (Local microfinance expert, July 2015)  
 
Therefore, despite the clear sector shift away from an NGO to a shareholder model of 
delivery, we observe how this doesn’t necessarily translate into all MFIs adopting a new 
business focus that allows for a good balance of the social and economic components of their 
missions. This has been seriously problematic in the case of Zambia where effective use of 
the limited investment available is critical.  
Discussion 
In this paper, we asked, how do legal and regulatory requirements shape the behaviour and 
performance of different ownership types of MFIs? To answer this question, we focused our 
efforts in Zambia, representing a challenging empirical context of regulatory flux which has 
produced unintended consequences in the MFI sector since its formal legal recognition in 
2006. Through a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with the key stakeholders 
in the Zambian microfinance sector, we were able to identify a number of key themes that cut 
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across these complex regulatory dynamics. As such, we make a number of key contributions 
to the literature that we will outline in the following.  
Firstly, the regulatory story of Zambia is a critical component in understanding the 
relationship between MFI activity and the institutional context. We build on the work of 
Khavul et al. (2013) who identified the contests over ‘regulatory logics’ that exist in the 
microfinance space, by emphasising the unintended consequences of regulatory frameworks. 
The institutional journey in Zambia depicts a fuzzy, poorly understood process by regulators 
where initial intentions were to improve the transparency of the system (non-prudential 
regulation) and move NGO-based MFIs to more commercialised shareholding entities. But 
their lack of understanding of the microfinance environment (consumption vs. enterprise 
lending) ultimately produced a need for an interest rate cap (prudential regulation) that 
plunged the sector into crisis, requiring the further drafting of new legislation. Therefore, the 
Zambia case tells us that understanding the complex regulatory process of microfinance 
should not just be seen in isolation between MFIs, commercial banks, regulatory bodies and 
law makers but the wider set of actors (e.g. pay day lenders, public sector workers) that can 
produce unintended consequences and shape the fate of the sector.  
Although prior research has demonstrated a close link between the regulatory context 
and MFI behaviour (Cull et al. 2011; Cull, et al., 2015), the dynamics of the regulatory story 
and their unintended consequences are rarely told. Therefore, we contribute to discussion in 
the literature concerning microfinance and failure (Siwale and Ritchie, 2013). Despite 
scholars identifying some of the institutional crises and threats facing MFIs these tend to be 
either in negotiated contested spaces or outside of the control of any actor involved in the 
sector (Khavul et al. 2013; Silva and Chávez 2015). However, through our empirical context, 
we have been able to highlight the unintended consequences of poorly conceived prudential 
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and non-prudential regulations, emphasing the institutionally complex conditions that MFIs 
operate within.   
Secondly, in such turbulent institutional conditions, our results offer a finding that is 
contradictory to much of the current research as they indicate the importance of foreign 
ownership (Mersland and Strøm, 2009). The idea of improved practice through local 
embeddedness has a long history and is rooted in ideas of ‘bottom-up’ development (Easterly, 
2001). The basic premise being that organisations which are dominated by local management 
are more likely to have access to relevant local networks and knowledge that help make more 
informed strategic decisions and understand their market context. Thus, external foreign 
actors may suffer from “inter-institutional” distance and a lack of understanding of the local 
market (Webb 2010). However, our Zambia case suggests that this idea may only hold in 
‘ordinary times’ and be dependent on the model that the regulatory system necessitates. As 
survival takes over in turbulent institutional conditions then mission drift seems to set in. 
However, foreign ownership appears to overcome this issue with better access to capital 
resources from outside that context; this seems to be an important boundary condition for 
understanding the relationship between (turbulent) institutional conditions, MFI ownership 
and their social/economic performance.  
Thirdly, poorly implemented prudential regulations can have disastrous implications 
for the health of the MFI sector, particularly for organisations with cultures that are 
historically rooted in a non-profit model. An organization’s culture constitutes their unique 
values and beliefs, which are drawn from in order to substantiate their identity e.g. the focus 
on social and economic missions. This acts as a context for understanding how decision 
makers in MFI  make sense of the organizations priorities (Moss et al., 2011). Given that 
non-profits tend to be embedded in a culture of giving and philanthrophy where commercial 
concepts are more difficult for decision-makers to identify with (Tracey and Phillips, 2007), 
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our results indicate that an inability to adapt the organization in such turbulent conditions is 
critical to MFI survival. Therefore, we contribute to discussion concerning the role and 
effects of MFIs adopting different profit and non-profit orientations (Shahriar et al., 2016) 
The aforementioned contributions also warrant consideration of areas for future 
research. From an organisational perspective, one promising avenue for research would be to 
examine how MFIs make the shift from an NGO to a for-profit model, taking into account 
how theories of organizational culture and identity interact with the formal and informal 
institutional conditions associated with developing economies. For profit and non-profit MFIs 
are culturally distinct in terms of strategy, structure, norms and values (Dart, 2004). At a 
culture and identity level, the aforementioned discussion indicates the numerous tensions 
involved between charity/problem solving, sacrifice/investment and caring/empowerment 
(Dees, 2012). In addition, we should add to analysis the role of foreign ownership in shaping 
new cultures and identity which could potentially be important to MFI survival and 
performance.  
In addition, our findings suggest a need to reconsider how cross-country analysis of 
the relationship between microfinance and institutional conditions is conducted. In analyzing 
the Zambia story, we see that there is crucial detail, such as the provision of an appropriate 
regulatory and legal framework, which accounts for the local MFI environment. The way in 
which cross-country analysis is currently conducted is problematic because it focuses on the 
individual effects of variables on MFI outcomes across a number of countries (e.g. corruption 
rates in Chliova et al., 2015), rather than taking a holistic case-based approach. We suggest 
borrowing from studies in political science to examine cross-national studies which account 
for holistic case-driven explanations with large sample sizes rather than focusing on the 
effects of individual institutional variables (Ragin, 2008).  
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In examining a story of regulatory failure, we also see important practical 
contributions from our findings. Although governments working through their central banks 
as regulators believe that regulating the sector will lead to the emergence of sustainable 
MFIs, this outcome is not given where regulations fail to address specificities of the local 
microfinance environment. Instead inappropriate regulations can in unpredictable ways 
contribute to the tension between offering support to further outreach to the unbanked and 
institutional survival. This requires regulators and law makers to not simply view 
microfinance as a sub-section of the commercial banking sector but viewing them as 
complementary part of a complex financial system. This requires rules and regulations that 
differentiate microfinance institutions from formal commercial banks and consumer lenders, 
and that protects the organizational ethos of MFIs so that their core function (poverty 
reduction) is retained and promoted.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we asked, how do legal and regulatory requirements shape the behaviour and 
performance of different ownership types of MFIs? By examining a story of regulatory 
failure in Zambia, we have highlighted one of the most critical institutional conditions that 
shapes microfinance activity. It emphasizes the complexities associated with regulation in a 
context where multiple actors have ultimately shaped the fate of a previously successful 
microfinance sector. The Zambian story is still unfolding and the long-term prospects of the 
sector continues to unravel as MFIs come to terms with the revised legislation. However, the 
story to date provides important lessons about the role of regulation in the microfinance 
world, the impact of poorly conceived actions and their unintended consequences.  
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